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COMMENT
PREGNANCY, DRUG USE, AND THE UNBORN CHILD:
WHEN A BABY'S LIFELINE LEADS TO NEONATAL DRUG
WITHDRAWAL
Kristie M. Piercet
ABSTRACT
As the war on drugs rages on in America, the most innocent victims
shine a beacon of hope on the controversial laws concerning fetal personhood.
Conflicting state laws regarding criminal prosecution of women who use
drugs during pregnancy have illuminated the deficient legal rights afforded to
the unborn in America. A society has a duty to protect is most fragile citizens
from exposure to toxic drugs, including its unborn children. Recent cases in
Alabama, North Dakota, and New Jersey have reflected the tension in states
trying to balance this duty to protect with the rights of women in the modern
privacy rights era. This article evaluates these cases and suggests the best
approach for states struggling to navigate the treacherous landscape of fetal
rights.
The criminalization of drug use during pregnancy has the potential to
open a new era of protection for the unborn. It is time for the states to
recognize fetal lives as children and afford them the utmost protection against
abuse. This article unlocks the current state of the law against mothers who
abuse drugs during pregnancy and reveals the proper guides for states dealing
with women who have given birth to drug addicted infants.
I. INTRODUCTION
Drug-addicted women and unexpected pregnancies are unfortunate
companions. In some cases, these women curb their addictions throughout
their pregnancies with the support of their families and health care
providers. But what about the women who cannot put their addictions on
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hold for the approximately nine months that it takes to carry a child?
Currently, whether a woman will face repercussions for exposing her
unborn child to harmful drugs depends on a number of factors. The lack of
proper attention to the rights of unborn children has caused many children
to be born struggling to break free from drug addiction. This Comment
reviews the current legal treatment of prenatal drug abuse and addresses
how the law should respond when newborns test positive for illegal drugs.
Modern abortion laws have made it clear that for certain purposes,
unborn children are not always entitled to the right to life.' However, in the
realm of torts, a person may be held liable for injuries inflicted on a fetus, so
long as that fetus is later born alive.2 Many states, however, protect women
from facing any penalty for actions taken during pregnancy, intentionally
or unintentionally, which harm their child upon birth. This complex
medley of definitions and protections has led to a judicial system that
recognizes that an unborn child may be a person, and something other than
a person, at the same time. In recent years, this inconsistency has carried
over to the realm of criminal child abuse prosecutions.3
The prosecution of mothers using illegal substances during pregnancy,
for the resulting harm caused to their children, has reignited the discussion
of personhood for the unborn. The issue is a sensitive issue that requires
courts to balance many competing critical interests.' One court noted that
two of the competing interests are a parent's constitutionally protected right"to raise a child and maintain a relationship with that child, without undue
interference by the state," and "the State's patens patriae responsibility to
protect the welfare of children."5 Despite the ultimate goal of child
protection, the majority of courts have hesitated to find mothers guilty of
criminal offenses for using drugs while pregnant. 6
This Comment addresses the judicial history and modern debate
regarding prenatal personhood with respect to child abuse prosecutions for
drug use during pregnancy. To supplement the limited body of criminal law
1. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992).
2. Jasinskyv. Potts, 92 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio 1950).
3. See discussion infra Part II.
4. N.J. Dep't of Children & Families, Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.L., 59 A.3d
576, 585-86 (2013).
5. Id.
6. James G. Hodge, Annotation, Prosecution of Mother for Prenatal Substance Abuse
Based on Endangerment of or Delivery of Controlled Substance to Child, 70 A.L.R.5th 461
(1999).
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regarding prenatal drug abuse, some civil child protection law will also be
discussed. Part II addresses the evolution of the issue. First, the
development and history of prosecutions for drug use during pregnancy
will be discussed. Next, Part II discusses recent state supreme court cases,
illustrating the inconsistency among the state courts. Part III addresses the
problems that have arisen because of these inconsistent standards being
applied to new mothers struggling to understand the complex law. Lastly,
Part IV proposes a number of measures that should be employed on the
state and federal levels to address mothers whose newborn children test
positive for drugs.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Rise of Rights for the Addicted Infant
The first attempt to charge a drug-using expectant mother with child
abuse occurred just four years after the landmark case of Roe v. Wade.7 The
California case rejected the prosecution of a mother on the basis that an
unborn child is not within the intended statutory meaning of the word"child."' The first conviction for prenatal child abuse resulting from a
pregnant mother's drug use occurred in 1997 in South Carolina in Whitner
v. State.9 The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States, which declined to accept the matter. ° The Court's denial of
certiorari allowed the states to continue resolving the matter on a state-by-
state basis. Recently, women in other states faced criminal charges for using
drugs during pregnancy." Several of the women charged brought the issue
before their highest state courts.12 These developments are discussed below.
7. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Reyes v. Super. Ct., 75 Cal. App. 3d 214 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1977).
8. Reyes, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 216.
9. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
10. Whitner v. South Carolina, 523 U.S. 1145 (1998).
11. See Exparte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 (Ala. 2013); State v. Stegall, 828 N.W.2d 526
(N.D. 2013); N.J. Dep't of Children & Families, Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.L., 59
A.3d 576 (N.J. 2013).
12. Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748; Stegall, 828 N.W.2d 526;A.L., 59 A.3d 576.
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
1. Reyes v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County: The Beginning of
the Issue
The first case dealing with prenatal child abuse related to exposure of
controlled substances in the womb was Reyes v. Superior Court of San
Bernardino County.'3 The California Court of Appeals considered whether a
woman addicted to heroin could be charged with child endangerment for
using heroin throughout her pregnancy. 4 The defendant, a mother who
ignored warnings from a public health nurse, gave birth to twins, both
addicted to heroin and suffering symptoms of withdrawal." The prosecutor
charged the woman with two counts of felony child endangerment. I" The
California child-endangerment statute provided for criminal charges to
anyone who willfully caused a child within their custody to be placed in a
dangerous situation, or a situation likely to produce great bodily harm or
death to the child.17
On the heels of Roe v. Wade," the court focused its analysis on the
determination of whether a fetus constituted a "child." 9 Ultimately, the
court held that a fetus was not within the legislature's intended definition of
a child for the purpose of criminal child endangerment.2" The court
reasoned that, despite the recognition of a fetus as a person in other areas of
law, an unborn child is not generally thought to be in the custody of its
mother until birth.2' Additionally, the court acknowledged that it would be
disproportionate to punish mothers who use drugs during pregnancy more
severely than those who obtained illegal abortions.2 While the application
of this ruling was limited to California, it began a line of future decisions
regarding prenatal drug abuse with similar holdings.23
13. Reyes, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 214.
14. Id. at 216.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) (West 1997).
18. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19. Reyes, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 217.
20. Id. at 219.
21. Id. at 218-19.
22. Id. at 218.
23. See People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Gethers, 585 So.
2d 1140 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1991); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992).
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2. Whitner v. State: The First Criminal Conviction for Pre-Natal
Substance Use
a. Factual setting of the case
Whitner v. State24 was the first appellate-level case in which a state
successfully prosecuted a mother for using illicit drugs during pregnancy.25
The case involved a woman who used cocaine during her third trimester of
pregnancy.2 6 The woman later gave birth to a son who had cocaine
metabolites in his system.27 The court did not mention any specific
symptom or illness affecting the child, however, the woman was charged
with criminal child neglect. 2 The defendant pleaded guilty to the offense,
reserving the right to appeal, and received a sentence of eight years in
29prison.
The defendant appealed her conviction on the basis that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction because child neglect was not intended to apply
to harm caused by a mother to her unborn child.3" The South Carolina
Supreme Court considered this argument but determined that the state had
a long history of considering the term "person" to include fetuses.3" With
respect to the lack of evidence of actual harm, the court noted that it is well
documented and within common knowledge that the use of drugs can cause
serious harm to a viable unborn child.32
b. Definition of child
The main argument before the court was whether the term "child" can
include a viable fetus for the criminal child neglect statute.3  The court
highlighted a long line of cases in other states that have excluded fetuses
from the class of individuals protected under criminal child abuse statutes,
24. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997); James G. Hodge, Jr., Annotation,
Prosecution of Mother for Prenatal Substance Abuse Based on Endangerment of or Delivery of
Controlled Substance to Child, 70 A.L.R.Sth 461 (Supp. 1999).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 778-79.
27. Id. at 778.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 778-79.
30. Id. at 779.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 782.
33. Id. at 779.
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but distinguished many of those cases because they dealt specifically with
defining the terms "delivery" and "distribution."34 Relying on a body of case
law specific to South Carolina, the court extended prosecution to a pregnant
mother's drug use.3" The court noted South Carolina's longstanding
recognition that a viable human fetus is a person with certain rights and
privileges.36 Citing previous South Carolina cases, the court relied on the
determination that "since a viable child is a person before separation from
the body of its mother and since prenatal injuries tortiously inflicted on
such a child are actionable, it is apparent that the complaint alleges such an'act, neglect or default' by the defendant, to the injury of the child."37
The court, in later discussion, also analyzed a Massachusetts case similar
to Whitner.3" The Massachusetts case required the court to determine the
rights of a fetus injured by the mother's drug use.39 The Massachusetts court
concluded that a fetus has rights pursuant only to the parent's desires.4"
Additionally, the court acknowledged that the state has an interest in
vindicating the life of a viable fetus, but this is not a right of the unborn
child, rather it is a state right.4' The Whitner court declined to adopt the
reasoning held by Massachusetts, stating: "the rationale underlying our
body of law-protection of the viable fetus-is radically different from that
underlying the law of Massachusetts."42 Therefore, the court determined
that a fetus is included in the plain meaning of the word "child."43
c. Defendant's challenge
In addition to her jurisdictional challenge, the defendant argued two
constitutional issues. First, the defendant argued that the statute, as written,
failed to provide her with fair notice." This argument was quickly dismissed
34. Id. at 782.
35. Id. at 782-83.
36. Id. at 779.
37. Id. at 780 (citing Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1964)) (emphasis
omitted).
38. Id. at 782-83 (citing Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct.
15, 1990)).
39. Id. at 783.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 785.
44. Id. at 784.
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by the court on the basis that a fetus is within the plain meaning of the word"child," and on the basis that the potential for injuries caused by the use of
cocaine during pregnancy is common knowledge." The defendant's second
constitutional argument was a "right to privacy" argument inspired by the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade.46 The court
dismissed the defendant's assertion that she had a fundamental right to
privacy to use crack cocaine during her pregnancy." The court reasoned
that because the use of crack cocaine is illegal regardless of one's pregnancy
status, merely being pregnant was insufficient to elevate the defendant's
drug use to a fundamental right.48 Since the defendant's rights did not
change during her pregnancy, the court found that her right to privacy had
not been violated.49 After the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the
defendant's conviction, Whitner appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States."° However, the Court denied certiorari, leaving the matter to
be resolved by the states on a case-by-case basis.5 '
3. In re Baby Boy Blackshear
a. Definition of child
In 2000, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of child abuse
after a woman gave birth to a son who tested positive for cocaine
metabolites in his system. 2 The court, much like South Carolina,
determined whether the charges were appropriate by determining whether
the word "child" includes an unborn fetus.5 3 After stating, "It is clear that
the action taken by [the mother] caused [the child] injury-both before and
after birth," 4 the court determined that the legislature intended the statute
45. Id. at 785.
46. Id.; see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
47. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 785.
48. Id. at 786.
49. id.
50. Whitner v. South Carolina, 523 U.S. 1145 (1998).
51. Id.
52. In re Baby Boy Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio 2000). The court previously
established that, for child custody proceedings, neglect and abuse includes injuries inflicted
by a mother's use of cocaine and opiates during pregnancy. In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935, 936
(Ohio C.P. Juv. Div. 1986).
53. Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d at 463.
54. Id. at 464-65.
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to cover a child's post-birth injury.55 Thus, the court held that when a
newborn tests positive for an illegal drug, due to prenatal drug abuse, the
newborn is "per se an abused child.51 6 The court reached its conclusion after
noting that newborns are entitled to constitutional rights, and "there can be
no more sacred or precious right of a newborn infant than the right to life
and to begin that life, where medically possible, healthy, and uninjured."57
b. Dissenting opinion
The majority opinion in Blackshear was met by a dissent that focused on
an essential issue. Justice Cook disagreed with the majority's classification
of a child exposed to drugs in utero as a "per se abused child."5" The dissent
noted that the statute does "not require that the parents inflict injury after
birth. It merely requires that the child suffer injury, due to an act by the
parents, that harms or threatens to harm the child's health or welfare."59 The
dissent takes issue with the court's equation of a positive drug screen with
injury of the newborn.60 While a positive drug screen of an infant would
support the conclusion that an infant has been injured, the injury must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence rather than simply assumed. 6' As
such, the dissent suggested the case should be remanded for a further
examination of the record to determine whether the exposure to cocaine
caused an actual harm, or threat of harm, to the child.62 This view has
gained popularity with courts today and will be discussed at length in the
next section.63
Following the Blackshear case, the state of Ohio has returned to its
previous determination that a mother may not be prosecuted for child
endangerment for drug use during pregnancy.6 This shift is illustrated in
the 2013 case of State v. Clemons65 where the court dismissed criminal
charges, of corrupting another with drugs, that were filed against one
55. Id. at 465.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 465-66 (Cook, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 466.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
64. State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992).
65. State v. Clemons, 996 N.E.2d 507 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013).
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mother.66 Despite the court's determination that a fetus was within the
definition of a person, the Ohio legislature provided specific exemptions to
mothers whose conduct during pregnancy results in harm to the child. In
holding as such, the court encouraged the legislature to consider an
appropriate response to the growing problem of prenatal drug use. 6
B. The Continuing Debate
After Blackshear, there was little recognition of criminal prosecution for
mothers who abused chemical substances during pregnancy.69 Recently,
however, some states have illustrated a shift towards broader recognition of
fetal rights with respect to prenatal child abuse. The following section
discusses three recent state supreme court cases that address the present
state of prenatal child abuse. The split today closely follows the prevailing
opinions when this issue first arose in the 1970's. Additional courts,
however, have recognized that an unborn child either does, or may under
certain circumstances, have rights concerning a mother's drug use during
pregnancy. The strengthening split in the jurisdictions has reopened the
discussion of defining an unborn child as a "person" or "child."
1. Ex Parte Ankrom
Alabama's approach, illustrated in Ex Parte Ankrom, 70 represents one
extreme regarding fetal rights. In a case that turned on whether an unborn
child would be recognized as a "child," the court held that unborn children
66. Id. at 507.
67. Id. at 511. The statute "essentially protects conduct by a woman during her
pregnancy that might or does result in the injury, illness, impairment or death of her child,
either before or after its birth. Thus, based upon a plain reading of the statute, a woman
cannot be criminally prosecuted for her conduct during pregnancy that results in harm to
her child." Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(B)(2)(b) (West 2012)).
68. Clemons, 966 N.E.2d at 512.
69. See State v. Armstard, 991 So. 2d 116 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a mother
cannot be charged with juvenile endangerment for drug use during pregnancy because the
transmission of the substance through the umbilical cord to the child was not a voluntary
act); State v. Wade, 232 S.W.3d 663 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the child
endangerment statute does not apply to a mother's conduct against her unborn child); State
v. Martinez, 137 P.3d 1195 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the state could not prosecute
the mother for child abuse for using cocaine during her pregnancy); State v. Aiwohi, 123
P.3d 1210 (Haw. 2005) (overturning a mother's manslaughter charges and determining that
a fetus is not a person under the manslaughter statute).
70. Exparte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 (Ala. 2013).
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do qualify as children under state law.7' As illustrated in this Comment, this
approach is held by only a minority of courts, but is gaining recognition.
Alabama focused on the need to protect unborn children and combat the
problem of drug use during pregnancy.72 The court considered this interest
in protecting children as one that outweighed a mother's interest in
avoiding criminal penalties for prenatal activity.73
a. Factual setting of the case
Ex parte Ankrom was the appeal of two consolidated cases before the
Alabama Supreme Court.74 Two mothers, both charged for acts during
pregnancy, appealed their criminal child abuse convictions. 75 The first
mother gave birth to a child who tested positive for cocaine shortly after
birth.76 The mother was "arrested and charged with chemical endangerment
of a child." 77 The second mother was charged after her child was born more
than fourteen weeks premature and lived only nineteen minutes.7' The
child's cause of death was determined to be acute methamphetamine
intoxication. 79 The second child's mother was charged with chemical
endangerment of a child that resulted in death.8" The mother in the first
case pleaded guilty and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment.8" The
sentence was suspended in exchange for one year of probation. 2 The
mother in the second case also pleaded guilty, reserving the right to
appeal.8 3 She was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.84
71. Id. at *20.
72. Id. at *1.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *1.
75. Id. at *1-2.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *1.
78. Id. at *3.
79. Id.
80. Id. at *2.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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b. Legal Analysis
Following the convictions, both mothers appealed. 5 The cases were
consolidated, and the mothers raised three main arguments in their appeal:
i) the term "child" does not include a viable fetus; ii) convicting new
mothers who struggle with substance abuse is bad public policy; and iii) the
convictions violated the United States and Alabama Constitutions. 6 The
court spent the majority of its analysis on the first challenge. The court
refrained from considering the public policy issue, recognizing the
legislature is free to amend the statute to produce a different result.8 7 The
constitutional arguments were not addressed because the defendants failed
to raise the issues in their initial grounds of first impression, on which the
court granted certiorari review. 8 Thus, the case again turned on the court's
definition of the word "child." 9
The court upheld the convictions after finding that the term "child"
includes all persons under the age of eighteen, rather than a person between
the age of birth and eighteen. 90 In doing so, the court rejected the opinion
held by the majority of states that have denied extending protection to
unborn children from their mothers' prenatal drug abuse.91 The court
reasoned that the meaning intended by the legislature is the meaning that
should be used.92 The court determined the legislative intent regarding the
meaning of the word "child" was not evident.93 Thus, the court applied the
"plain meaning" of the word as defined in the statute, which it determined
was broad enough to include the unborn within its protection.94
Ex Parte Ankrom is representative of the conservative views held in
South Carolina and Alabama.95 These states have each noted that they have
85. Id. at *4.
86. Id. at *8.
87. Id. at*19.
88. id.
89. Id. at *20.
90. Id. at *17.
91. Id.
92. Id. at*19.
93. Id. at *15.
94. Id. In 2006, Alabama enacted the Brody Act, which redefined the term "person" for
the purpose of criminal homicide as "a human being, including an unborn child in utero at
any stage of development, regardless of viability." ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1 (2014).
95. State v. Stegall, 828 N.W.2d 526, 532 (N.D. 2013).
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a history of including the unborn within the definition of "child."96 The
court in Ankrom noted that Alabama has afforded a viable fetus certain
protections in the fields of homicide law and civil liability for wrongful
death.9" The court cited an earlier case stating, "[I]t would be 'grossly
inconsistent ... to construe a viable fetus as a 'person' for the purposes of
imposing civil liability while refusing to give it a similar classification in the
criminal context."'98 Two justices dissented, reasoning that the legislature
did not intend to include the unborn within the protection of the chemical
endangerment statute.99
The Alabama Supreme Court confirmed its position regarding the
chemical endangerment of a child exposed to drugs while in utero in April
2014.1"0 In Hicks v. State, a woman appealed her conviction for chemical
endangerment after she delivered a child who tested positive for cocaine in
his system at birth.' The court reiterated that the term "child" in the
chemical-endangerment statute 10 2 unambiguously refers to all children-
born and unborn. 3 The court also held that the statute, as applied against
mothers who use drugs during pregnancy, is not unconstitutionally
vague.104 Rather, the court stated that the statute plainly "protects all
children, born and unborn, from exposure to controlled substances."0 5
2. State v. Stegall
The Supreme Court of North Dakota also addressed prenatal substance
abuse in 2013.106 Unlike the Ankrom case, the court in State v. Stegall10 7
ultimately held that an unborn child is not within the protection of the
North Dakota statute regarding child endangerment.' 8 Stegall followed the
96. Id.
97. Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *6 (citing Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964)
and State v. Horne. 319 S.E.2d 703 (1984)).
98. Id. (citing State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984)).
99. Id. at *24 (Murdock, J., dissenting); id. at *25 (Malone, J., dissenting).
100. Hicks v. State, 2014 WL 1508698 (2014).
101. Id. at *1.
102. ALA. CODE § 26-15-3.2 (2014).
103. Hicks, 2014 WL 1508698 at *5-6.
104. Id. at *12.
105. Id.
106. State v. Stegall, 828 N.W.2d 526 (N.D. 2013).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 531-33.
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2009 North Dakota Supreme Court case of State v. Geiser, 9 which held that
a woman who overdosed on drugs and gave birth to a deceased child at
twenty-nine weeks was exempt from punishment under the state statute
pertaining to offenses committed against the unborn.1 ° Four years later,
Stegall required the court to address the issue of women who expose their
unborn children to drugs during pregnancy and later give birth to living
children who test positive for drugs."'
a. Factual setting of the case
Stegall was the consolidation of three cases addressing criminal child
endangerment charges for prenatal drug use." 2 Stegall gave birth to a child
who tested positive for methamphetamine shortly after birth."3 As a result,
the state charged Stegall with endangerment of a child."4 Following the
charges, Stegall fled from arrest, but was apprehended six months later.1
The case was dismissed by the trial court on the determination that Stegall
had not "knowingly or intentionally" caused the child's exposure to the
chemical substance. 16
The second defendant in the case, Hettich, was charged with criminal
child endangerment after giving birth to twins."7 The twins tested positive
for methamphetamine shortly after birth."' Testing done at the hospital
also revealed that the mother had methamphetamine in her system."9 The
trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that the state failed to prove
probable cause to support a charge of child endangerment.' The third
defendant, Lamon, was charged with one count of endangerment of a child
109. State v. Geiser, 763 N.W.2d 469 (N.D. 2009).
110. Id. at 470. Under North Dakota law, "[a] person is guilty of negligent homicide of an
unborn child, a class C felony, if the person negligently causes the death of an unborn child."
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-17.1-04 (West 1987). However, the word "person," as
applicable to criminal offenses against unborn children, does not include the child's mother.
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-17.1-01(2) (West 1987).
111. Stegall, 828 N.W.2d at 528.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 529.
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after giving birth to a son who tested positive for methamphetamine
immediately after birth.' The trial court dismissed the complaint despite
the state's argument that the child continued to be exposed to the substance
after birth.'22
b. Legal analysis
The North Dakota Supreme Court had previously determined that the
child endangerment statute was not intended to apply to drug use that
causes a pregnant mother to give birth to a stillborn child.'23 Thus, the court
in Stegall was addressing only the narrow issue of whether the child
endangerment statute applies to postpartum injuries sustained by a child
due to a mother's drug use during pregnancy.'24 Relying on the Geiser case,
the court determined that the statute was not intended to apply to injuries
inflicted in utero.'25 Balancing this case with the court's previous holdings,
the court reasoned that it would be inconsistent to punish a mother whose
child is born alive with drugs in its system, but not to punish a mother
whose drug use caused fatal injury to the child before its birth. 6 The court
stated that it would be an "absurd result" to "criminalize conduct that is not
a crime at the time the conduct occurs, is not a crime if the unborn child
dies in utero, but is a crime only by virtue of its effect on the child born
alive."'27 Thus, the court affirmed all three of the dismissals.' This case
solidified the rule of law in North Dakota that unborn children have little
protection against the actions of their mothers regardless of whether they
suffer minimal, life-long, or even fatal injuries.
The court further exposed children to abuse by explicitly stating that the
state would not punish mothers whose drug use results in a miscarriage,
noting:
[T]here is no distinction between a factual scenario in which the
pregnant woman prenatally ingests a controlled substance and
the child subsequently dies in utero and the factual scenario in
which the child is born alive for purposes of criminal prosecution
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 531-32 (citing State v. Geiser, 763 N.W.2d 469, 470 (N.D. 2009)).
124. Stegall, 828 N.W.2d at 529.
125. Id. at 532-33.
126. Id. at 533.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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of the mother. This conclusion is supported by our decision in
Geiser in which we held an unborn viable fetus is not a child
under the endangerment of a child statute and, therefore, a
mother is not criminally liable for endangerment of a child under
[the statute] for acts she commits that expose her unborn child to
controlled substances. 2 9
As such, a pregnant woman in North Dakota cannot face criminal penalties
for any prenatal conduct that ultimately harms her child. 3 °
3. New Jersey Dep't of Children & Families, Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. A.L.
As the name indicates, the case of New Jersey Department of Children and
Family Services"' was a child custody proceeding rather than a criminal
case. Despite the difference in the nature of the proceedings, it lends helpful
insight to the issue of child abuse and neglect resulting from prenatal drug
use. The court held similarly to the dissenting opinion in Blackshear,'32
noting that the statute could apply to drug use during pregnancy only if the
child clearly manifested some actual post-birth injury.'33
a. Factual setting of the case
The New Jersey case involved a woman, identified only as A.L., who gave
birth to a child that tested positive for cocaine. 34 The mother also tested
positive for cocaine shortly before the birth of her child.135 The child was
monitored at the hospital and all tests revealed that the child was healthy
and "normal" shortly after his birth, the following day, and upon
discharge.'3 6 Despite multiple positive drug tests during her pregnancy, the
mother denied using drugs. 37 The Division of Youth & Family Services
129. Id. at 532-33 (citing State v. Geiser, 763 N.W.2d 469, 469 (N.D. 2009)).
130. Id.
131. N.J. Dep't of Children & Families, Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.L., 59 A.3d 576
(N.J. 2013).
132. In re Baby Boy Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d 462, 465-66 (Ohio 2000) (Cook, J.,
dissenting).
133. A.L., 59 A.3d at 592.
134. Id. at 581.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 582.
137. Id. at 581.
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promptly responded to the positive drug report from the hospital.3 Their
investigation included discussions with A.L.'s five-year-old child, A.L.'s
parents, with whom the older child lived, and the father of the newborn
child.'39 The report from these initial meetings revealed that the older child
was appropriately dressed and groomed, however, the Division initiated a
Safety Protection Plan, which required A.L.'s parents to supervise her
contacts with her children.'"
Solely in response to the mother's two positive drug tests during her
pregnancy and the child's positive drug test, the Division moved for a
finding of abuse and neglect by A.L. and had the children placed in
protective custody.' The trial court entered the order of abuse and neglect
against the mother after finding that the existence of cocaine in the child's
system was evidence that the mother had exposed the child to "substantial
risk of harm."'4 The appellate court affirmed the findings.'43 The lower
courts focused on the potential for imminent harm and the strong risk for
harm that is present when newborns test positive for cocaine.'"
b. Legal analysis
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the finding of the lower courts
and the Division of Youth & Family Services after determining that the
record lacked evidence of any actual harm suffered by the child.'45 The court
noted that the use of the word "child" in the neglect and abuse statute had
been interpreted to apply to a child from birth to eighteen years.'" Thus,
"the primary question under Title 9 [the abuse and neglect statute,] is
whether A.D., as a newborn, had been impaired or was in imminent danger
of becoming impaired as a result of his mother's failure to exercise a
minimum degree of care .... ,1 The court analyzed the New Jersey child
protection statutes in detail, noting that several other statutes exist to deal
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 581-82.
141. Id. at 582.
142. Id. at 583.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 583-84.
145. Id. at 592.
146. Id. at 587.
147. Id. at 588 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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particularly with expectant mothers struggling with drug addiction.1"8 The
court specifically noted:
The Legislature has also provided two additional bases to protect
children in these circumstances: (1) the Division can offer
services to expectant and new mothers under certain
circumstances, with their consent; and (2) the Division can seek
a court order to intervene and require a mother to undergo
treatment, or seek other relief, if the best interests of the child so
require.149
Thus, the court held that the neglect and abuse statute was improperly
applied to the case of A.L. due to the lack of any proven harm or imminent
risk to the child.' It is important to note that the court focused not on the
fact that the child had not been injured, but on the lack of evidence to reveal
the severity or extent of the mother's drug use, how recently she had used
drugs, and the potential for future harm to the child."5'
c. Balancing of interests in New Jersey
Because this case was a child protection case rather than a criminal case,
the court was able to evaluate the issue of prenatal drug use in the context of
a large body of established law protecting children from various forms of
abuse. ' 2 This case sufficiently recognizes that unborn children have a need
for protection, yet a family unit may not be best served by severe sanctions
against a mother who has given birth to an otherwise normal child." 3 The
148. Id. at 595.
149. Id. at 581 (citations omitted).
150. Id. at 592. Montana has taken a similar approach regarding children who suffer
visible injury at the time of birth. In re M.J., 296 P.3d 1197, 1198 (Mont. 2013). Custody of
one mother was terminated in a neglect and abuse proceeding when her baby, who tested
positive for methamphetamine and marijuana, was born suffering "from liver disease, gastric
reflux disease, cycocel trite, cloudy corneas, a partial occipital infarct, hearing and visual
impairments, seizures, and brain damage." Id.
151. A.L., 59 A.3d at 589. ("A court 'need not wait to act until a child is actually
irreparably impaired by parental inattention or neglect."') (citing In re Guardianship of
D.M.H., 736 A.2d 1261 (N.J. 1999)).
152. Id. at 580.
153. See id.
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
outcome of this case may have been entirely different had the child been
born with clear signs of harm due to its prenatal exposure to drugs.154
In the realm of child protective services, the focus of the proceedings is
broadened and the ultimate goal is to find a solution that is in the best
interest of the child.' The courts must balance the competing interests of
"a parent's constitutionally protected right to raise a child and maintain a
relationship with that child, without undue interference by the state, and
the State's parens patriae responsibility to protect the welfare of children." '56
This broader approach of considering the state's interest in protecting
children from harm by their mothers during and after pregnancy should be
the standard in criminal proceedings as well.
d. Application of the New Jersey rule
The ruling in the case of A.L. has been applied in two subsequent cases in
which the court found that the mothers' drug use during pregnancy
constituted abuse and neglect. 7 In both cases, the children suffered from
observable physical ailments as a result of the exposure to drugs in the
womb.'58 In New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. D.E.J.,"s9 the
court found that a mother of four neglected her newborn child who tested
positive for drugs.6 ' The judge reasoned that the infant's positive drug test
and withdrawal symptoms were sufficient to sustain an abuse and neglect
finding. 6' The court noted that the mother had previously given birth to
two other children who tested positive for drugs at birth. 62 With the current
child, the withdrawal symptoms required that the newborn remain
154. Id. at 584. See In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 344, 351 (1999) (holding
that parental rights were appropriately terminated when the child required a month-long
hospitalization due to withdrawal symptoms, required two surgeries for a cleft palette, and
experienced long-term hearing impairment).
155. A.L., 59 A.3d at 586.
156. Id. at 585-86 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. D.E.J., 2013 WL 3064447, *5 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2013) (holding that the mother abused and neglected the child born with a
positive drug test and suffered feeding intolerance, symptoms of withdrawal and was in a
"medically fragile" state); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Y.N., 431 N.J. Super. 74 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
158, D.E.J., 2013 WL at *5; Y.N., 431 N.J. Super. at 76.
159. D.E.J., 2013 WL 3064447.
160. Id. at *1, *9.
161. Id.
162. Id. at *9.
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hospitalized for five weeks after birth.163 The court reiterated that "not every
instance of drug use by a parent during pregnancy, standing alone, will
substantiate a finding of abuse and neglect[.]""M Moreover, "[p]roof that a
child's mother frequently used cocaine or other dangerous substances
during pregnancy would be relevant to that issue."165
In a second case, the Superior Court of New Jersey affirmed a finding of
abuse and neglect in the case of a mother who gave birth to a child whose
severe withdrawal required treatment in the NICU and numerous doses of
morphine over an extended period of time.'66 The court also noted that
"[w]here there is evidence of actual impairment, it is immaterial whether
the drugs taken were from a legal or illicit source."1 67 These cases illustrate
that the New Jersey law is more workable than the approaches of Alabama
and North Dakota. The approach not only recognizes that unborn children
are entitled to a healthy life, but also preserves the mother's rights by
punishing the mother only when actual damages have arisen.
III. PROBLEM
A. The Reason for the Various State Statutes
The cases addressed above illustrate the complexity of the competing
interests to be considered when approaching the topic of sanctioning drug
use during pregnancy. To date, at least seventeen states have attempted to
criminally prosecute women who have exposed their unborn children to
drugs during pregnancy. 6' Whether the consequences are criminal
punishment, or termination of parental rights, the impact of the law in this
area can be life long. The courts must properly consider women's
163. Id.
164. Id. at *8 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
165. Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
166. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Y.N., 431 N.J. Super. 74 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2013).
167. Id. at 82.
168. Matthew Derringer, If Addiction Is A Mental Disease, Let's Start Treating It Like
One: An Additional Recommendation for the Indiana General Assembly's Prenatal Substance
Abuse Commission, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 141, 147-48 (2011). The states include Indiana,
Florida, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Texas, Ohio, Nevada, Maryland, Missouri, Kentucky,
Louisiana and South Carolina. Id. at 148 n.34. Additionally, charges have been filed for
prenatal drug use in North Dakota, Hawaii, California, Alabama, and New Mexico. See supra
Part II; see also supra text accompanying note 69.
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reproductive and parental rights while safeguarding the health and safety of
its future citizens. This, of course, can lead to an array of legal and social
issues. The following section further details many of the difficulties that
have led to the current checkerboard approach of punishing mothers who
use drugs during pregnancy.
1. What Exactly is a Fetus?
One of the determining factors in most states is whether a fetus is
entitled to the same legal protections as a child, or more plainly, whether a
fetus is a child. 69 Courts have chosen to answer this question in a variety of
ways."' Therefore, the answer not only depends on the location of a mother
and her unborn child, but also on the legal context of the issue. As
illustrated in Whitner v. State, the Supreme Court of Alabama emphatically
held that a viable fetus is a child.' Based on this strong conviction in
Alabama, the state has determined that the chemical-endangerment of a
child extends to born and unborn children alike. 7 2
There are, however, also many states that exclude the unborn from
certain legal rights and protections.1' These states generally focus not on
the interest of protecting unborn children, but on complex statutory
schemes that have been developed in a piecemeal fashion and applied in a
variety of contexts. 174 When given a chance to protect unborn children from
the harmful effects of pre-birth exposure to drugs, states like New Jersey
have instead defined their child neglect and abuse statutes to specifically
protect only children from birth to age eighteen.7 5 In such states, unborn
children only receive protection when the results of the drug use can be fit
into another category of crime. The resulting legal scheme fails to
consistently protect the victims of prenatal drug use. Sadly, this approach
also does little to deter women from prenatal drug use and has lead to many
successful constitutional challenges of the law as applied against mothers.
169. See discussion supra Part II.
170. See discussion supra Part II.B.
171. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 785 (S.C. 1997).
172. Id.
173. See discussion supra Part II.
174. Reyes v. Super. Ct., 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 217-18 (Ct. App. 1977); see discussion supra
note 67.
175. N.J. Dep't of Children & Families, Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.L., 59 A.3d
576, 587 (N.J. 2013).
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In jurisdictions that do not consider the term "child" to include the
victims of prenatal drug abuse, the next consideration is whether a fetus is
an independent being from its mother. Some states have determined that
until a child is born and living independently from its mother's body, it is
merely an extension of the mother's body.176 In this situation, drug use by a
pregnant woman is equivalent to drug use by any other person. Thus, there
would not be grounds for any heightened punishment relating to the health
and welfare of the child.
While a fetus needs its mother for continued development and growth,
significant problems arise when the law takes the position that a fetus is a
mere part of the mother's body.'77 This approach leads to the belief that a
mother is free to do anything to her body and the child she carries. For
example, in Virginia, one woman could not be criminally charged after she
smothered her newborn child while the umbilical cord was still attached
and the placenta was inside her body. 7 ' The Virginia law treats a fetus as a
part of the mother's body, and only provides penalties for individuals who
injure "the fetus of another."'79 If the act would have been committed by a
third party, rather than the child's mother, he or she would have been
charged with a felony, punishable by five to forty years in prison.'
Additionally, in Virginia an individual who knowingly murders a pregnant
woman may receive a heightened sentence to account for the life of the
unborn child.' These laws are applied in a discriminate fashion due to the
confusion of fetal rights before the law. As a result, unborn children, even
those children in their first moments of life outside the womb, are left to
suffer at the hands of their mothers.
a. State personhood statutes
Three states have attempted to pass statutes explicitly granting
"personhood" to unborn children. Colorado attempted, in 2008 and again
in 2010, to pass statutes that would grant unborn children personhood
176. Angela Hatcher, Campbell County Mother Can't be Charged in Baby's Death,
WWBT-TV NBC 12 (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.nbcl2.com/Global/story.asp?S=11690000.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32.2 (West 2013).
180. Id.
181. VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-32.1 (West 2013).
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status."2 Both ballot measures involved amending the state's constitution to
define the word "person."8 3 The 2008 proposed amendment defined the
term person as "any human being from the moment of fertilization."" 4 The
2010 version omitted the word fertilization and instead defined a person as"every human being from the beginning of the biological development of
that human being.'8 5 The goals of the proposed amendments were to grant
unborn children the same rights as all who have been born and to prohibit
abortions.8 6 Neither amendment was adopted. 7
Mississippi and Oklahoma have also attempted to enact fetal personhood
laws.' The Mississippi initiative proposed in 2011 would have amended
the state constitution to extend personhood to "every human being from
the moment of fertilization, cloning, or the functional equivalent thereof."89
The Mississippi initiative was rejected by voters in 2011 and died on the
182. Colo. amend. 48, Definition of Person (2008),
www.leg.state~co.us/lcs/ballothistory.nsf/ (follow "Next" hyperlink; then follow "Definition
of Person" hyperlink); Colo. amend. 62, Application of the Term Person (2010),
www.leg.state.co.us/lcs/ballothistory.nsf/ (follow "Application of the Term Person"
hyperlink).
183. Id.
184. Colo. amend. 48, Definition of Person (2008),
www.leg.state.co.us/lcs/ballothistory.nsf/ (follow "Next" hyperlink; then follow "Definition
of Person" hyperlink).
185. Colo. amend. 62, Application of the Term Person (2010),
www.leg.state.co.us/lcs/ballothistory.nsf/ (follow "Application of the Term Person"
hyperlink). This change was done in an attempt to grant broader rights to the unborn,
including asexually reproduced human beings.
186. Electa Draper, "Personhood"Amendment Fails By 3-1 Margin, DENVER POST (Nov. 3,
2010), www.denverpost.com/ election2012/ci_16506253.
187. Colo. amend. 48, Definition of Person (2008),
www.leg.state.co.us/lcs/ballothistory.nsf/ (follow "Next" hyperlink;.then follow "Definition
of Person" hyperlink); Colo. amend. 62, Application of the Term Person (2010),
www.leg.state.co.us/lcs/ballothistory.nsf/ (follow "Application of the Term Person"
hyperlink).
188. Miss. Initiative 26, Definition of "Person," (2011), http://www.sos.ms.gov/Elections-
Voting/Documents/Definition%20of%20 Person-PW%20Revised.pdf; Steve Olafson,
Oklahoma "Personhood" Bill Fails in Legislature, REUTERS (Apr. 19, 2012),
www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/20/us-usa-oklahoma-personhood-
idUSBRE83O2N20120420.
189. Miss. Initiative 26, Definition of "Person," (2011), http://www.sos.ms.gov/Elections-
Voting/Documents/Definition%20 of%20Person-PW%20Revised.pdf.
[Vol. 9:181
2014] PREGNANCY, DRUG USE, AND THE UNBORN CHILD 203
legislative floor when it was reintroduced in the 2012 legislative session. 9 °
Oklahoma also attempted to enact a personhood statute pertaining to the
rights of the unborn.' The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however,
determined that the statute was in violation of the U.S. Constitution. 192 As
such, the bill was struck from the ballot.' 93
Unfortunately, these personhood bills were fraught with uncertainties
that left much to be desired. The focus of both support and criticism for all
three bills was the effect they would have on abortion and stem cell
research.'94 The right to equal protection of the unborn in all other areas of
law, such as prenatal substances abuse, was immediately overshadowed by
these uncertainties. The complexities of abortion law are certainly
important and will continue to play out for years to come. Because of the
polarizing nature of proposed state regulations of abortion, the personhood
initiatives are unlikely to be a viable route to justice for victims of prenatal
drug abuse.
2. Difficulties With Measuring the Harm
As the case law has reflected, unless the harm is immediately apparent, it
can be difficult to measure the risk of injury to the newborn. With
insufficient evidence regarding the extent of harm caused by the drug use of
the mother, punishment for the drug exposure can become even more
inconsistent. In Ohio, the court relied on the generally accepted position
that cocaine is harmful to its users.' 95 As such, the court determined that,
regardless of outward signs of injury, drug use during pregnancy always
harms a child.' 96 While much of the research is outdated, research by the
National Institute on Drug Abuse shows:
Illicit drug use during pregnancy has been associated with a
variety of adverse effects, though more research is needed to
190. Virginia Chamlee, Mississippi 'Personhood' Efforts Revived, FLA. INDEP.,
http://floridaindependent.com/72888/mississippi-personhood-efforts-revived (last visited
Feb. 19,2014).
191. Olafson, supra note 188.
192. Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28 (Okla. 2012) (cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 617,
187 L. Ed. 2d 400 (U.S. 2013)) (citing the Supremacy Clause and Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
193. Id.
194. Olafson, supra note 188.
195. In re Baby Boy Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d 466 (Ohio 2000).
196. Id. at 465.
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draw causal connections. Effects may be subtle, and generally
range from low birth weight to developmental deficits affecting
behavior and cognition. For example, impaired attention,
language, and learning skills, as well as behavioral problems,
have been seen in children exposed to cocaine and marijuana, all
of which can affect success in school. Methamphetamine
exposure has been associated with fetal growth restriction,
decreased arousal, and poor quality of movement in infants. And
although use of heroin (an opiate) during pregnancy has been
associated with low birth weight, the impact of prescription
opiate abuse on pregnancy outcomes is not well understood.'97
Thus, it is true that drug use during pregnancy may cause long-term effects
that are not initially observable. 9s It would, however, be far too speculative
for judges to simply guess about what developmental issues a child may face
and which of those potential issues could be directly linked to the mother's
drug use. Unfortunately, this lack of comprehensive research creates more
questions than answers for courts attempting to measure the potential long-
term harm caused by mothers who use drugs while pregnant. The only
harm that can truly be measured is that which is manifested at the time of a
child's birth or is supported by expert testimony.
3. Compatibility With Other Laws Concerning Unborn Children
To better understand the current fetal rights in the United States, it is
helpful to briefly compare a few common approaches. Injuries to unborn
children have been addressed in various types of law. States have taken
different approaches depending on whether the injury is inflicted by
mothers, fathers, or unrelated third parties. Generally, in the civil context,
unborn children are not entitled to individual causes of action.199 However,
a child may have its own cause of action for injuries sustained in utero
197. NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PRENATAL EXPOSURE TO DRUGS OF ABUSE (May 2011),
available at www.drugabuse.gov/sites/default/files/prenatal.pdf.
198. Id.
199. Aaron Wagner, Comment, Texas Two-Step: Serving Up Fetal Rights by Side-Stepping
Roe v. Wade Has Set the Table for Another Showdown on Fetal Personhood in Texas and
Beyond, 32 TEX. TECH L. Riv. 1085, 1099-1100 (2001) ("The entire fetal rights debate turns
on at what point the fetus' rights 'attach.' States have not agreed on when this point should
be, but most commonly states base the attachment of fetal rights on one of two theories. The
'born-alive' rule and the theory of 'viability' are oftentimes dispositive of a court's or
legislature's treatment of a fetus .... ).
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when it is later born alive with a physical injury.E°° Parents may also take
other legal action when an injury against the mother causes the child to die
before birth.2"' Such claims are, however, considered legal remedies to the
parents for the loss of the child.20 2
The rationale for the "born alive rule" is similar to the approach of New
Jersey, which focuses on actual post-birth harm.2 3 However, North Dakota
has expressly rejected the born alive rule with respect to injuries resulting
from drug use during pregnancy. 2°4 This creates problems, such as those in
Virginia, where unborn children are not protected from abuse by their
mothers.2 5 The rule leaves large gaps in the law and permits individuals to
get away with causing fatal injuries to unborn children. Similarly, the North
Dakota courts have noted that there is no need to treat unborn children as a"person" for some laws but not others.2 6 Other courts, however, declined to
extend this position in two recent cases involving the exposure of innocent
unborn children to drugs.20 7 Thus, nearly all states have left their most
fragile citizens with legal rights that continually fail to protect them from
serious injury, or even death, caused by their own mothers.
Federal law has also addressed the problem of crimes against fetal life
with the Unborn Victims of Violence Act first introduced in 2001.208 The
Act provides penalties for crimes committed against unborn children.2 9
The federal law defines the term "unborn child" as "a member of the species
homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb."2 0
According to the Act:
200. Id. at 1108.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. N.J. Dep't of Children & Families, Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.L., 59 A.3d
576, 592 (N.J. 2013).
204. State v. Stegall, 828 N.W.2d 526, 532 (N.D. 2013).
205. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
206. See Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862, 865 (N.D. 1984) ("We believe that it is
commonly understood that an unborn child is a human being or person which has life and
which, even prior to the process of birth, can experience death.").
207. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
208. Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2001, H.R.503, 107th Cong. (2001) (codified at
18 USC § 1841).
209. 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2012).
210. 18 U.S.C. § 1841(d) (2012).
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Whoever engages in conduct that violates [specified provisions
of the Federal Criminal Code, including the Controlled
Substance Act of 1970] and thereby causes the death of, or bodily
injury ... to, a child, who is in utero at the time the conduct takes
place, is guilty of a separate offense under this section.... [T]he
punishment for that separate offense is the same as the
punishment provided under Federal law for that conduct had
that injury or death occurred to the unborn child's mother.2 '
Unfortunately, the Act provides exceptions barring prosecution of any
woman with respect to her own unborn child.212 This is yet another example
of the lack of consistent protection for unborn children victimized by their
own mothers. This federal law illustrates that there is certainly a recognized
interest in protecting the unborn, but that the mother's rights are again
given greater weight.
4. Difficulties with Prosecuting New and Expectant Mothers
In the minority of states that criminalize drug use during pregnancy, the
penalty of admitted or discovered drug use is often incarceration. Some
scholars have argued that the threat of incarceration of new and expectant
mothers can deter women from seeking appropriate medical care or seeking
help with their addictions.2"3 Additionally, the lack of pertinent laws results
in prosecutors charging these women with crimes ranging from child
endangerment to murder.2"4 Criminal punishment of mothers for prior
drug use has also been seen as a retroactive solution to the problem, since at
the time the baby tests positive for drugs, the harm has already occurred.1 5
Despite these concerns, the strong interest in protecting unborn children
can quickly outweigh the issues presented by prosecuting and incarcerating
new mothers. The system can work to restore both the health of the child
and the health of the mother.
211. 18U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1)-(2)(A) (2012).
212. 18 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(3) (2012).
213. Seema Mohapatra, Unshackling Addiction: A Public Health Approach to Drug Use
During Pregnancy, 26 Wis. J.L. GENDER & SocY 241, 251 (2011).
214. Derringer, supra note 168, at 147.
215. Id. at 150. Indiana has attempted to implement a civil commitment program to
proactively aid mothers who struggle with drug use during their pregnancies. For more on
the civil commitment approach, see id. at 154-64.
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IV. PROPOSAL
A. How States Can Better Protect the Victims of Fetal Drug Abuse
Currently, drug use during pregnancy has only been addressed on the
state level. Thus, states have broad freedom to draft solutions that eliminate
many of the problems with the current approach. Now is the time for state
legislatures to exercise their power to protect the most innocent victims of
drug abuse. Many of the consistency issues have resulted from the lack of
state legislation addressing the unique issue of drug use during pregnancy.
To better serve mothers and their children, states should draft appropriate
statutes that provide clear consequences to women who expose their
unborn children to harmful amounts of drugs while in the womb.
1. Statutory Protection
a. Defining child
First, to properly address this issue, states need to clearly define the term
"child" as including unborn children. Such a definition would permit states
to prosecute women who expose their unborn children to drugs in the same
manner as if the child were already born. To take such a bold approach in
statutorily defining life would eliminate many of the inconsistency
problems seen in today's laws regarding the unborn. The example of the
laws in Virginia illustrates how states have failed to hold women
accountable for harming their infant children even after the child has taken
its first breath. E"6 Harmonious recognition that the right to life begins at
conception is essential to sufficiently protecting unborn victims of neglect
and abuse.
At the very least, states must provide clarification in the state neglect and
abuse or chemical-endangerment statutes as to the consequences of
inflicting injury upon fetal life. The statutes providing exemptions for
mothers who negligently or intentionally harm their unborn children must
be eliminated. There is simply no excuse to continue to allow mothers to
knowingly poison their unborn children with illicit drugs. The adoption of
statutes specifically targeted towards mothers who use drugs during
pregnancy would allow certainty in the courts and would provide consistent
results. This would also ensure that an appeal by a woman convicted of
drug use during pregnancy would fail due to vagueness or lack of notice.
216. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
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b. Measuring the harm
A state response to the issue of prenatal child abuse would also require
courts and legislatures to work together to find the appropriate barometer
of abuse. The courts have struggled between adopting a law that finds any
drug use to be per se abuse and a law that refuses to acknowledge the vast
potential for harm. As states have already seen, it is difficult to speculate
what harm might come to a child. A proper state response should provide
pertinent factors or guidelines for courts attempting to measure the harm.
To best draft statutes pertaining to prenatal drug use, the legislatures must
also have evidence that the actions of the mother are indeed harmful.
The New Jersey courts have prudently recognized the difficulty of
measuring the injury sustained by infants who aire exposed to drugs in
utero.217 There, the courts have limited abuse and neglect findings to cases
that demonstrated actual or imminent risk of harm."I This rule works well
because it bases establishment of guilt not just on actions of the mother but
also on actual proof of injury to the child. This is in contrast to the State of
Ohio, which once considered a positive drug test of a newborn to be per se
criminal child abuse.219 It is certainly concerning anytime a child tests
positive for harmful substances. However, it rings close to a strict liability
crime when mothers are charged for child abuse despite the lack of proof
that any harm actually has or will occur. Thus, to have significant notice of
the crime, and the full deterrence effect, states wanting to charge mothers
with per se abuse need to draft appropriate criminal statutes to deal with
prenatal drug use.
Effective April 28, 2014, the State of Tennessee imposed a statute that
imposes criminal punishment on women who use illegal narcotics during
pregnancy and the child "is born addicted to, or harmed by the narcotic
drug and the addiction or harm is the result of [the mother's] illegal use of a
narcotic taken while pregnant."22' The Tennessee courts have not yet had a
chance to articulate the specific meaning of the language of the statute,221
217. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
218. N.J. Dep't of Children & Families, Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.L., 59 A.3d
576, 592 (N.J. 2013).
219. In re Baby Boy Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ohio 2000).
220. TENN. CODEANN. § 39-13-107(c)(2) (2014).
221. Aaron Wright, Mom Charged Under Drug-Addicted Baby Law Going to Rehab (August
5, 2014), available at www.wbir.com/story/news/local/mcminn-monroe/2014/08/0S/woman-
charged-under-drug-addicted-baby-law-to-appear-in-court/13614755/. The first woman to be
charged under the new statute admitted to using meth just days before delivering her child in the
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but it appears to require a showing that the child suffered actual harm or
actual symptoms of addiction to the illegal narcotic. 2 2 Thus, the statute
shows the legislature's efforts to expressly address prenatal substance abuse
and efforts to attempt to measure the harm.223 It will be important to track
the application of this statute in future cases to see if it has its intended
effect.
The child abuse and neglect statutes implicated by prenatal drug abuse
criminalize not only actual harm to a child, but also substantial risk of
harm. The court in New Jersey noted that the degree of speculation is in
part due to the lack of evidence presented by the government to illustrate
the risk of ongoing harm. 2 4 A federal database that tracks the long-term
effects of prenatal drug exposure would provide useful evidence of the
severity and certainty of the injuries a child may ultimately suffer due to the
prenatal drug exposure. A federal study would allow the prosecution to
articulate and support the true risk of harm to the child. This research
would also allow for better diagnoses and treatment for children suffering
from the effects of prenatal drug abuse. Such research tracking the effects of
drug use during pregnancy is essential for courts and legislatures to
appropriately measure the harm done to unborn children.
2. Providing Rehabilitation-Focused Resources
Once states have ensured that the law is sufficiently clear, states can
further aid the victims of prenatal drug use by providing better resources in
the event that a woman is convicted of using drugs while pregnant. While
traditional incarceration of new or expectant mothers may be
counterproductive, many states offer treatment programs to women during,
or in the place of, incarceration. These programs fill a gap in caring for
addicted mothers since private rehabilitation is often unavailable to low-
income, pregnant women.2 5 Fortunately, all fifty states participate to some
extent in the federally funded Residential Substance Abuse Treatment
summer of 2014. Id. The judge agreed to stay the assault charge for sixth months while the
mother attended a rehabilitation program. Id. According to the woman's attorney, she was
hopeful that her course of action would allow her to have continued visitation with her baby girl.
Id.
222. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(2) (2014).
223. Id.
224. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.b.
225. David F. Chavkin, "For Their Own Good"- Civil Commitment of Alcohol and Drug-
Dependent Pregnant Women, 37 S.D. L. REv. 224, 240 n.115 (1992).
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("RSAT") Program.226 The RSAT program provides specialized help and
aftercare for individuals in jail on drug related offenses.227 Over seventy
percent of program participants completed the program between 2010 and
2012.228 While not all participants go on to live drug free lives, seventy-two
percent of program participants remained arrest-free one year after
completion.229 This program, and others like it, offer people the tools they
need to break their addictions and live more fulfilling lives post
incarceration. Rehabilitative incarceration programs like RSAT allow new
mothers to take the time they need to recover from their addiction before
returning to care for their children.
Some states also work with mothers to allow them to stay with their
children while serving out their sentences and working through
rehabilitation. California has addressed the issue of incarcerating pregnant
and new mothers with a special program tailored to pregnant drug users
called the Pregnant and Parenting Women's Alternative Sentencing
Program Act. 230 Eligibility for the program is limited to pregnant or
parenting women with an established history of substance abuse who have
one or more children under six years old at the time of entry into the
program.23" ' For women with young children, the children reside with the
mother in the treatment facility.232 Further exclusions apply to women
convicted of certain violent offenses or offenses committed against
children.233
The California program is designed to provide a rehab focused
environment where mothers can continue to interact with their children on
a daily basis.23" The women who complete the one-year program serve an
additional year of intense parole before being discharged from parole.235
226. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, RESIDENTIAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT
PROGRAM CLOSEOUT REPORT, Jan. 2010-Mar. 2012, available at
https://www.bja.gov/Publications/RSAT0312CloseoutReport.pdf.
227. Id. at 2.
228. Id. at 13.
229. Id.
230. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1174 (West 2013).
231. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1174.4(a)(1) (West 2013).
232. Id.
233. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1174.4(a)(2) (West 2013).
234. For more on the California program, see California Department of Corrections
Opens San Diego Family Foundations Program Facility, available at
http://cdcrtoday.blogspot.com/2000/1 1/california- department-of-corrections.html.
235. Id.
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Women who do not successfully complete the program must be returned to
prison and serve their original sentences.236 Data early in the program's
development revealed that the one-year recidivism rate was between nine to
sixteen percent after successful program completion. 23 7 The program gives
women a second chance to renew their roles as mothers while taking back
their lives from the firm grip of drug addiction. Adoption of programs like
this one give states the ability to support women struggling with substance
abuse and protect the health and lives of unborn children. 38
Thus, while criminal prosecution limits the individual freedom of drug-
using new and expectant mothers, available assistance programs offer a
wealth of resources that can break the addiction and lead to a safer,
healthier lifestyle for mother and baby. It is important that states continue
to develop and fund programs that offer rehabilitation to mothers both
during pregnancy and while their children are young. Prosecuting mothers
for drug use during pregnancy is not simply for the child's sake or the sake
of society. Rather, it can effectively deter and rehabilitate women who
struggle with addiction during pregnancy. The availability of resources in
all fifty states would send a message that the nation cares about all of its
citizens and will do what is needed to keep struggling mothers with their
children.
B. How the Federal Law Can Better Protect the Victims of Fetal Drug Abuse
With the issue of prenatal child abuse rising to the highest state level, and
additional courts recognizing the criminal prosecution of prenatal
substance abuse, there is strong potential for the issue to be addressed by
the Supreme Court of the United States. The potential constitutional issues
236. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1174.4(i) (West 2013).
237. CAL. DEP'T OF CORR., FEMALE OFFENDERS PROGRAMS: COMMUNITY PRISONER MOTHER
PROGRAM AND FAMILY FOUNDATION PROGRAM 5 (2008),
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/adult-research-branch/research-documents/mother-program-and
_family-foundation-may-2008.pdf.
238. Unfortunately the programs enacted under the Pregnant and Parenting Women's
Alternative Sentencing Program have been phased out. The California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation cite a decline in qualified candidates as the reason for the
elimination of these community based rehabilitation programs. CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. &
REHAB., REALIGNMENT FACT SHEET 4 (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/realignment-fact-sheet.pdf. (last visited Feb. 23,
2014); CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. & REHAB., THE FUTURE OF CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONS: A
BLUEPRINT TO SAVE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, END FEDERAL COURT OVERSIGHT, AND IMPROVE THE
PRISON SYSTEM 26-27 (2012), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/2012plan/docs/plan/complete.pdf.
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of fundamental rights of the unborn, notice, and privacy may compel the
Court to hear the appeal of mothers prosecuted for using drugs during
pregnancy. While an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States
would pose a strong risk for further chipping away at the rights of the
unborn, such an appeal would allow at least some of the inconsistencies to
be resolved at a national level.
1. Protecting Life at Conception
While the issue of prenatal drug abuse as a whole may be best left to the
states, the Supreme Court of the United States has a strong interest in
ensuring that the victims of prenatal drug abuse are afforded the right to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness upon which our nation was
founded.239 It is certainly a national issue when a court in Ohio can declare
that "there can be no more sacred or precious right of a newborn infant
than the right to life and to begin that life, where medically possible,
healthy, and uninjured,"240 yet crossing state lines may defer that precious
right until the child's umbilical cord is severed and it takes its first breath.
The recent prenatal drug abuse convictions have again opened the door for
the Court to take a stand for unborn children and recognize that life begins
at conception. Unfortunately, looking to how the Court implicitly denied
personhood to unborn children in Casey and Roe, it is unlikely that a
national consensus would be reached in favor of the unborn. 4
2. Balancing the Competing Interests
Rather than granting unborn children the fundamental right to be
protected from their mother's drug use, the Court is more likely to respond
as it did in Casey.242 There, the Court entered into a general balancing test,
weighing the state's interest in protecting its future citizens against a
mother's right to privacy in her reproductive decisions. 243 Evaluating
prenatal drug use under the same test may result in greater protection for
the unborn. First, the Court has acknowledged that a woman has a
239. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
240. In re Baby Boy Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ohio 2000).
241. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 ("[T]he State has legitimate interests from the outset of the
pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become
a child.") (emphasis added); Roe, 410 U.S. at 154, 156, 163 (referring to State's interest in
protecting "potential life."). Further, the Court explicitly stated that the Fourteenth
Amendment's use of "person" does not include the unborn. Id. at 158.
242. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
243. Id.
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fundamental right to privacy in the decision of whether or not to give birth
to a child.2' This interest was then weighed against the interest of a state in
protecting fetal life.245 Thus, this is the framework that would likely be
applied to the evaluation of a prenatal child abuse case.
In determining the interests of a mother who continues to use drugs
during pregnancy, South Carolina correctly noted that the Supreme Court
has recognized there is no privacy right in the use of illegal drugs.246 As
such, the interest of a mother, in using drugs during pregnancy, is
miniscule. The interest of the state in protecting unborn children during
pregnancy is "profound."247 When balanced with the low interest in using
drugs during pregnancy, the Court would be likely to find that the state's
interest is stronger than the mother's, and extend some viable options for
states wishing to prosecute mothers for illegal drug use during pregnancy.
3. Adopting the Observable Harm Requirement
The implementation of criminal prosecution for drug use during
pregnancy is best handled on the state level. However, if the Supreme Court
were to address the issue, the Court may clarify the required level of harm
necessary before a woman can be convicted. Categorizing a positive drug
test as per se abuse would provide the strongest incentive to avoid drug use
during pregnancy. This standard would also eliminate the problem of
determining exactly when, and how often, the mother used illicit drugs.
However, this standard is so high that it risks punishing women whose drug
use may have been so minimal that it did very little to interfere with the
child's overall health & wellbeing. Since the consequences of being
convicted for prenatal child abuse are so severe, the Court should require
proof of substantial risk of harm or actual observable harm before women
can be convicted. As such, if the Supreme Court addresses the issue, it
should adopt an approach similar to the New Jersey civil child abuse
244. Id. at 896.
245. Id. at 872.
246. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 786 (S.C. 1997) ("Use of crack cocaine is illegal,
period. No one here argues that laws criminalizing the use of crack cocaine are themselves
unconstitutional. If the State wishes to impose additional criminal penalties on pregnant
women who engage in this already illegal conduct because of the effect the conduct has on
the viable fetus, it may do so. We do not see how the fact of pregnancy elevates the use of
crack cocaine to the lofty status of a fundamental right."); see Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 409 (2005) (holding that there is no privacy right in the possession of contraband).
247. Whitner, 392 S.E.2d at 785-86 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
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cases. 4 ' This approach provides the best barometer for the Court to
determine an appropriate sentence based on the extent of exposure and
injury inflicted upon the, child.149
V. CONCLUSION
Only time will tell whether criminal prosecution of drug use during
pregnancy will become a springboard for fetal rights nationwide. It is clear
that the issue has the potential to sculpt the legal rights of unborn children
across the country. To require criminal penalties for women who expose
their children to drugs in the womb is the strongest way to protect the
innocent victims of prenatal drug use. However, there are many proactive
steps that states can take to better treat women addicted to drugs during
pregnancy. Additionally, current law fails to consistently define the process
by which a woman can be charged for her use of drugs during pregnancy.
With respect to federal action, as we learned in Roe,25 the decisions made
by the Supreme Court regarding fetal rights and the definition of "child"
can lead to the protection, or abandonment, of an entire generation.
Action can be taken on both the state and federal levels to better protect
the victims of prenatal substance abuse. Unfortunately, the broader issue of
the right to life from the moment of conceptions is likely to carry on
unresolved for some time to come. Nevertheless, the recognition of an
unborn child's right to be free from exposure to illegal drugs is a step
towards protecting life at all stages. The tragedy of prenatal child abuse has
brought new momentum to the personhood debate. The vast
inconsistencies in the law of fetal rights are now in the spotlight, and it is
time for change. Thus, what has been a tragedy for the victims who suffer at
the hands of their mothers could become a victory for future generations.
248. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
249. See discussion supra Part IV.A.I.b (discussing the need for establishment of a federal
database).
250. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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